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Judicialization efforts following atrocity tend toward: (1) criminal prosecution and punishment for 
violations of international criminal law, and (2) civil litigation for violations of international criminal 
law. By and large, the reach of international criminal law is limited to serious violations of core civil 
and political rights. Therefore, notwithstanding certain exceptions where violations of social, 
economic, and environmental rights have become implicated, the focus of judicialization efforts 
remains limited to core civil and political rights. 
 
There is much to celebrate in the enforcement of international criminal law; there also is much to 
critique and improve upon. Part of the improvement project involves recognizing that criminal 
prosecutions and civil litigation concerning violations of core civil and political rights offer only a 
partial print of justice. Ever since the divide effected in international human rights law in the 1960s,1 
economic, social, cultural, and environmental rights have mixed quite uneasily with third-party 
criminal or civil enforcement strategies.2 This tentativeness exists, in part, because these rights have 
been constructed as aspirational. Economic, social, cultural, and environmental rights have been 
defined as expecting behavior on the part of state actors, as opposed to—with some exceptions—
obliging state actors to refrain from engaging in certain behavior. This classification, and the 
allocation of resources it necessarily engenders, is understandable in that gruesome violations of civil 
and political rights—mass murder, torture, sexual assault—present an immediacy to them that 
explains the consensus in favor of prosecuting and suing individuals who directly perpetrate such 
travesties. As a result, socioeconomic and environmental crimes or wrongs have become poorly 
articulated in judicial settings, prodding some experts to conclude that accountability for such crimes 
is compromised.3  
 
This accountability gap is disappointing because atrocious infringements of civil and political rights 
tend to occur in societies that have neglected and often even trampled on socioeconomic rights and 
developmental opportunities. Violations of civil and political rights tend to be multi-causal in origin 
and, in many cases, are facilitated by systemic factors such as economic crimes, exploitation, and 
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organizational misfeasance. In Sierra Leone, for example, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
found that the internecine conflict was fueled by control over diamond resources. 
 
This paper proceeds in two steps. The first part explores how enforcement of international criminal 
law currently addresses socioeconomic and environmental crimes. After surveying the field generally, 
I specifically examine current efforts to promote accountability, whether through criminal 
prosecutions or civil litigation, for: (1) environmental war crimes and (2) property crimes and 
expropriation.  
 
I take these two crimes as examples for a number of reasons. First, although crimes of a 
socioeconomic and environmental nature are generally poorly articulated in international criminal 
law, these specific crimes are exceptions to the norm because they are reasonably developed in 
conventional and customary international criminal law and, hence, offer more than just a conjectural 
discussion. Although it remains true that the proscription of these crimes is subject to considerable 
ambiguity and vagueness, these crimes are among the more coalescent within the constellation of 
international crimes outside mainstream civil and political rights violations. Second, both of these 
crimes address conduct that can have a deleterious impact on development insofar as they are 
connected to security of markets and environmental support systems. 
 
Third, environmental war crimes and property crimes/expropriation are inextricably intertwined 
with conflict and, consequently, arise amid broader collective questions of prevention and transition. 
Violations of property rights can serve as precursors to eliminationism. As the International Military 
Tribunal at Nuremberg (IMT) observed, the Holocaust began with property destruction, 
occupational discrimination, and expropriation of the assets of European Jews. Conflicts and 
atrocities inflict wanton damage on environmental supply networks that, unless remediated in the 
wake of atrocity and as part of postconflict transition, simply may reactivate competition over fragile 
resources that, in turn, may catalyze hatreds that then re-explode. Societies with ecosystem and 
socioeconomic insecurity remain prone to massive civil and political rights violations as well as 
forced refugee movements.  
 
With this descriptive element as a basis, the second part of the paper engages in a normative 
discussion of whether increased judicialization of environmental war crimes and property crimes is a 
worthwhile pursuit for those committed to accountability, prevention, transition, and development. 
Although I provide some conclusions capable of generalization, my basic goal is to present a critical 
analysis of the use of international law for criminal prosecutions and civil litigation involving 
socioeconomic and environmental crimes that are reasonably well articulated, have a developmental 
impact, and are linked to other atrocities that are traditionally the focus of transitional justice 
measures. In the end, and of interest to transitional justice practitioners, the paper concludes that it 
is unclear whether increasing the number, scope, and reach of legal institutions necessarily leads to 
effective prevention of socioeconomic and environmental wrongdoing generally or to justice for 
those individuals who have engaged in such wrongdoing. 
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How Does Enforcement of International Criminal Law 
Currently Address Violations of Socioeconomic and 
Environmental Rights? 
 
International human rights law recognizes a number of social, economic, cultural, and 
environmental rights. However, few of these are justiciable in the sense that the law—whether 
criminal or civil—actively provides a remedy for a breach of the positive right or a firm obligation to 
satisfy that right.  
 
The limited number of crimes that are social, economic, cultural, or environmental in nature and 
that attract international penal responsibility include: unlawful deportation or forcible transfer;4 
pillage;5 plunder;6 extensive or wanton destruction and appropriation of property;7 devastation not 
justified by military necessity;8 destruction of institutions dedicated to religion, charity, education, 
the arts and sciences, historic monuments, and works of art and science;9 persecution as a crime 
against humanity;10 apartheid;11 widespread, long-term, and severe damage to the natural 
environment;12 arms smuggling, trading in weapons, and supplying key weapons materials;13 and 
financing of terrorism, or atrocity generally, which can constitute an independent crime (for 
example, terrorist financing or conspiracy) or a theory of liability (for example, aiding and 
abetting).14 Other socioeconomic crimes that facilitate atrocity and bear upon developmental issues 
include unlawful trafficking in drugs and related narcotics offenses, trafficking in persons and sex 
work, piracy, bribery, corruption, extortion, money laundering, recruitment of child soldiers,15 and 
organized crime. 
 
In actuality, however, there is little law-in-practice. Few socioeconomic crimes have been prosecuted. 
The International Criminal Court (ICC) encompasses a broad set of enumerated crimes that include 
a socioeconomic and environmental dimension, in particular under the rubric of war crimes. Thus, 
socioeconomic and environmental crimes may become more mainstreamed. For now, however, it is 
too early to tell. Moreover, given the reticence that has been demonstrated regarding criminal 
prosecutions or civil lawsuits for socioeconomic and environmental crimes in the past, it would be 
foolhardy to make any prediction that the ICC will be more fulsome in this regard. Chief Prosecutor 
Luis Moreno-Ocampo has expressed an ambition to implicate individuals who served as economic 
actors in natural resources exploitation and arms trade in East Africa. However, to date there has 
been limited investigatory or punitive activity in this regard.16 In all likelihood, the ICC will focus 
only on a small number of the most provably direct perpetrators of, or commanders who ordered, 
multiple violations of core civil and political rights. 
 
Scholars and jurists have inquired whether certain core international crimes could be committed by 
attrition. A number of scenarios present themselves. Genocide by attrition or famine crimes, for 
example, might involve a state or authority deliberately adopting policies that knowingly induce 
famine or starvation among a protected group.17 In another example, a state or authority may restrict 
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a protected group’s access to shelter, public health services, or water such that the population faces 
elimination, extermination, or persecution.18 In this vein, article 8(2)(b)(xxv) of the Rome Statute 
proscribes as a war crime in international armed conflict “intentionally using starvation of civilians as 
a method of warfare by depriving them of objects indispensable to their survival, including willfully 
impeding relief supplies as provided for under the Geneva Conventions.” Another scenario involves 
state negligence when official policies unknowingly induce humanitarian catastrophes. Yet another 
scenario involves a state’s failure to take affirmative measures to meaningfully instantiate 
socioeconomic rights. 
 
In light of the mens rea requirements that attach to extraordinary international crimes, it is unlikely 
that anything other than the first two presented scenarios could attract penal responsibility. In 
contrast, civil or declaratory relief might attach to a state’s failure to meaningfully implement 
affirmative socioeconomic rights to food, shelter, or sustenance.19 As the second part of this paper 
points out, however, it remains unclear whether criminalizing or judicializing such failures would 
better anchor the positive rights within the socio-legal fabric so as to promote developmental goals. 
 
This paper discusses environmental war crimes and property crimes in greater depth in both the 
criminal context and the civil context. For environmental crimes, I limit the civil context discussion 
to the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), a U.S. statute that creates a tort remedy for violations of the 
laws of nations. For property crimes, I focus on criminal culpability for destruction of homes in 
conflict situations and, in the civil context, liability for expropriation in the case of arbitrary evictions 
from public tenancies, once again in conflict situations, as adjudicated by the European Court of 
Human Rights. Although acts of expropriation without compensation generally do not trigger 
individual penal culpability, they certainly can attract civil responsibility as unlawful economic 
activity. 
 
Environmental War Crimes 
 
Inflicting damage on the environment in times of war, and abusing the environment as a tool of war, 
has been commonplace throughout the history of armed conflict. The Romans salted the soil at 
Carthage, the United States defoliated Vietnamese forests with Agent Orange, and Saddam Hussein 
intentionally spilled and ignited Kuwaiti oil wells in the Persian Gulf. During conflicts in Rwanda 




Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute now criminalizes as a war crime in international armed 
conflict “[i]ntentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause . . . 
widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment which would be clearly 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated.” Although this 




www.ictj.org       8 
prohibition emerges from the preexisting corpus of customary and conventional international 
humanitarian law,20 Antonio Cassese posits that it is narrower in scope than preexisting law.21 
Nevertheless, the express inclusion of article 8(2)(b)(iv) in the Rome Statute breaks new ground by 
criminalizing violations and meting out individual penal responsibility, and doing so within an 
international sanctioning institution. Article 8(2)(b)(iv) is “ecocentric”—that is, no direct harm to 
humans has to be found in order for liability to be triggered.22 
 
Assuredly, other war crimes in the Rome Statute could incidentally address environmental harms.23 
Examples include article 8(2)(a)(iv) (prohibiting extensive destruction and appropriation of property 
not justified by military necessity and carried out wantonly and unlawfully), article 8(2)(b)(xvii) 
(prohibiting the use of poison and poisoned weapons), and article 8(2)(b)(xviii) (prohibiting the 
employment of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases). These, however, are not environmental 
crimes stricto sensu but are “anthropocentric”—that is, they criminalize things or practices that 
principally are inhumane and only incidentally have devastating effects on the environment. 
 
Notwithstanding Cassese’s aforementioned observation, article 8(2)(b)(iv) represents a step forward 
for those who favor judicialization and the individuation of penal responsibility at the international 
level. The preexisting law either triggered only state responsibility or merely encouraged states to 
criminalize the prohibited conduct in their national legal systems. As Kevin Jon Heller and Jessica 
Lawrence note, those international conventions concerned with environmental destruction at most 
give states the discretion to criminalize violations.24 As the lone exceptions, Additional Protocol I and 
the Fourth Geneva Convention do require extradition or prosecution of individual perpetrators, but 
only in cases of grave breaches.25 
 
The state responsibility approach undergirded the creation of the United Nations Compensation 
Commission (UNCC) in response to Iraq’s unlawful occupation of Kuwait. UN Security Council 
Resolution 687 made Iraq accountable for direct loss and damage, including environmental damage, 
resulting from Iraq’s unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait. Other than the UNCC, however, 
the record is sparse regarding holding states liable for environmental war crimes. In terms of 
individual penal responsibility, some individual prosecutions occurred at Nuremberg for pillage, 
scorched-earth tactics, and devastation. Results were mixed: Alfred Jodl was convicted by the IMT, 
and Lothar Rendulic was acquitted by an American Military Tribunal. Unlike article 8(2)(b)(iv), 
these alleged crimes were not strictly ecocentric.  
 
Although breaking new ground, article 8(2)(b)(iv) also instructs on limitations to the effectiveness of 
criminalizing the infliction of environmental harms during armed conflict. First, it will be very 
difficult to actually find a violation. The three elements—“widespread, long-term, and severe”—
must be proven conjunctively. Moreover, insofar as these terms are not defined in the Rome Statute 
or in the Elements of the Crimes, the actus reus of the crime is somewhat vague. I have elsewhere 
argued that the ICC, were it to adjudicate charges brought under article 8(2)(b)(iv), would likely 
turn to preexisting understandings, in particular the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any 
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Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD) and Protocol I.26 Whereas 
interpretative work under ENMOD accords fairly accessible definitions of widespread, long-lasting, 
or severe,27 it is unclear whether these shall inform interpretation of the Rome Statute because 
ENMOD’s requirements are disjunctive. The Additional Protocol I interpretive guidelines, which 
are conjunctive, are much more likely to apply.28 According to Heller and Lawrence, if Protocol I’s 
definitions are imported into article 8(2)(b)(iv), the prohibition will become “a virtual nullity.”29 
The only term referenced in the background work to the Protocol is “long-term,” which is 
contemplated to mean damage that lasts for decades. Moreover, for the purposes of Protocol I, 
widespread is understood to mean “several hundred square kilometers,” and severe means “any act 
that prejudices the health or survival of the population.”30 The definition of “severe” portends a 
return to the same anthropocentrism that article 8(2)(b)(iv)’s language seems to eschew. 
 
Furthermore, the standard of proof (that is, the scientific certainty of the harm) could make it very 
difficult to convict a defendant. This is not inherently inappropriate because a criminal defendant is 
entitled to a prosecution that has to discharge a very high burden of proof, but it militates against 
criminal prosecutions actually turning into convictions or even being brought in the first place. 
These concerns, Heller and Lawrence note, have already “played a critical role in the refusal of the 
Committee that reviewed NATO’s bombing campaign against Yugoslavia to recommend 
investigating that campaign’s environmental damage.”31 
 
The stringent mens rea requirement is yet another limitation to the reach of article 8(2)(b)(iv). The 
harm must be inflicted intentionally and with knowledge that the attack will create such damage. As 
a result, only the “most invidious offender” is captured—namely, “the individual who knows that his 
or her behavior will cause widespread, long-term, and severe damage to the environment and, 
notwithstanding proof of this knowledge, still commits the act with the full intention of causing such 
damage.”32 The mens rea is purely subjective and, consequently, there is no room to capture 
negligent, willfully blind, or reckless behavior.  
 
A third limitation is article 8(2)(b)(iv)’s proportionality requirement. The proportionality between 
the actus reus and the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated seems vague. 
Moreover, in terms of a de facto defense, the threshold to establishing military advantage is quite 
low. The impugned conduct has to be clearly excessive in relation to the overall military advantage 
anticipated (as opposed to “military necessity” tests that are found elsewhere in customary and 
conventional international humanitarian law). The injection of modifiers such as “clearly,” 
“concrete,” and “direct overall” is also novel33 and conspires to make the successful establishment of 
the requisite level of proportionality very difficult for the ICC Prosecutor. 
 
In addition, article 8(2)(b)(iv) does not apply to internal armed conflicts.34 This limitation is 
particularly problematic because most armed conflicts in the modern age are internal, and no 
evidence demonstrates that internal armed conflicts are per se less environmentally destructive than 
international armed conflicts. On the contrary: 
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Insurgency and counter-insurgency guerrilla civil wars have a particularly devastating 
effect on local environments. Insurgents often use tropical forests as home bases and 
hiding grounds; counter-insurgency forces often respond by slashing and burning 
forests and by polluting rivers, viewing both as legitimate theaters of operations.35 
 
However, even if some of these limitations could be corrected36 by the insertion of clearer language 
in the Rome Statute or the Elements of the Crimes thereto, or definitional thresholds less weighted 
against conviction, or expansion to internal conflict, or creation of an independent crime of 
“geocide” or “ecocide,”37 other structural limitations are not so readily correctible. Such limitations 
include:  
 
• Environmental concerns might get lost in the shuffle due to the ICC’s finite resources and 
the gravity of the other crimes brought to its attention.38 The difficulty in convicting 
individuals of environmental war crimes might have a chilling effect on the Prosecutor. To 
some degree, this has been the experience at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR). The conflict in Rwanda “has seen two national parks landmined, endangered 
species poached, agricultural lands rendered barren . . . and systematic resettlement 
exhausting moderate lands—specifically in eastern Congo—of their agricultural capacities. 
The [ICTR] has made no mention of these issues in its proceedings or in any of the 
mandates it has authorized.”39 Domestic prosecutions in Rwanda also have been reticent to 
examine this environmental desecration.  
 
• Judges and prosecutors may not have sufficient expertise in environmental matters. 
 
• Punishment and sentencing are problematic. Insofar as the ICC’s jurisdiction is limited to 
natural persons, no corporate, institutional, or state culpability is possible. Is sequestered 
imprisonment of guilty individuals an effective sanction for environmental war crimes? Will 
the distant threat thereof deter future commission of the offense in the “fog of war”? Will it 
help remediate the harm? Will incarceration provide justice for victims in postconflict zones? 
(These questions arise for violations of socioeconomic rights as well, and, as I have explored 
elsewhere, limitations to hegemonic correctional preferences also affect their effectiveness as 
responses to infringements of core civil and political rights).40 To be sure, there may be some 
possibilities for restitution and access to the Victims Trust Fund. However, it remains 
unclear whether sufficient funds can be tapped to remediate desecrated and uninhabitable 
lands. Failure to remediate could create a basis for further conflict, competition over 
resources, and refugee movements.41 Would the Trust Fund extend to a situation where “it is 
the natural environment directly, and humanity only indirectly, that bears the loss of the 
crime”?42 
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• The international response to environmental crimes needs to look beyond armed conflict. 
Many major environmental disasters occur in peace time (for example, the Chernobyl 
meltdown and negligence and subsequent delays in notification) or in processes of 
mobilization to armed conflict (for example, weapons testing) or demobilization (for 
example, decommissioning, destruction of weapons).43 
 
In the end, stigmatizing environmental war crimes through the ICC has important expressive value, 
but this value may quickly dissipate if there are no prosecutions or if successful prosecutions fail to 
improve the lot of individuals living in the environmentally desecrated areas. Consequently, alternate 
remedies such as insurance schemes, state responsibility, collective sanctions, specific performance, 
remediation, mandated detoxification, restitution, and injunctions are pertinent. In fact, these 
remedies might be more suitable for environmental war crimes because they operate at a lower 
evidentiary threshold—perhaps at the level of willful blindness. Since prosecutions and civil lawsuits 
are essentially reactive, entirely political strategies such as providing ex ante technology and resources 
for the development of less environmentally destructive weaponry might hold promise. Many of 
these remedies and strategies fall entirely outside of the purview of the criminal law, thereby 
suggesting the important limitations of criminalizing intentional harm inflicted on the environment 
during armed conflict. Although criminal convictions generate considerable stigma, the reach of the 
criminal law, no matter how far it extends, can only accomplish so much. Assuredly, none of these 
alternate remedies is a panacea. In fact, as the next section demonstrates, the law-in-practice is not 




The U.S. Alien Tort Claims Act44 (ATCA, also known as the Alien Tort Statute [ATS]) reads as 
follows: “The District Courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort 
only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”45 Conduct 
violates the law of the nations if it infringes upon “well-established, universally recognized norms of 
international law.”46 Liability under the ATCA extends to both individual and corporate tortfeasors.   
 
In re “Agent Orange” Product Liability Litigation is a case under the ATCA that involves allegations 
of, inter alia, environmental war crimes. The plaintiffs in Agent Orange were Vietnamese nationals 
who claimed against various chemical companies. Plaintiffs alleged property damage and personal 
injuries incurred from toxic defoliant herbicides that defendants manufactured and sold to the U.S., 
which were in turn used in Vietnam during the Vietnam War.47 The Eastern District of New York 
found that liability was possible since “international law clearly and specifically defines aiding and 
abetting liability.”48 The court asserted that recognized norms in international law provided a 
“‘specific, universal and obligatory’ norm against aiding and abetting that was well-established long 
before the Vietnam War.”49 When it came to the claim that the use of Agent Orange in Vietnam 
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violated the laws of nations, however, the court was much more reticent. It held that “herbicide 
spraying . . . did not constitute a war crime pre-1975.”50 
 
The plaintiffs mostly couched their arguments in an anthropocentric sense, focusing on the harms 
the herbicide spraying inflicted on the civilian population. The court rejected the claim that 
herbicide spraying was encompassed by the prohibition on poison or poisoned weapons. It opined 
that the prohibition (at least within the context of the 1925 Geneva Protocol) “extended only to 
gases deployed for their asphyxiating or toxic effects on man, not to herbicides designed to affect 
plants, that may have unintended harmful side-effects on people.”51 The court also noted that “[n]o 
treaty or custom affecting environmental protection created a rule effective before 1975 making 
illegal the use of herbicides as used in Vietnam.”52 Interestingly, the court considered Protocol I and 
ENMOD language regarding the prohibition of widespread, long-term, and/or severe damage to the 
natural environment (the ecocentric prohibition). It noted that the fact Protocol I’s prohibition 
came after the Vietnam War suggested that it was not a binding part of the law of nations at the time 
of the war.53 Neither the U.S. nor Vietnam was a party to ENMOD when use of Agent Orange had 
stopped.54 The District Court did not opine that these prohibitions formed part of customary 
international law, however, thereby underscoring the salience of article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome 
Statute (which the court did not consider). 
 
In 2008, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the Agent Orange decision upon de novo 
review.55 To determine whether the use of Agent Orange violated the law of nations, the appellate 
court characteristically defined sources of international law as international conventions, 
international customs, general principles of law recognized by civilized nations, and judicial decisions 
or the works of highly qualified publicists.56 However, before a court can permit a claim under the 
ATCA, it “should require any claim based on the present-day law of nations to rest on a norm of 
international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to 
the features of the 18th-century paradigms” of international law.57 Thus, for a claim to succeed 
under the ATCA, the prohibited act must be specifically defined and universally accepted by the 
civilized world.58 Like the District Court before it, the Second Circuit ruled that the prohibition 
against defoliation failed both elements.59 So, Agent Orange leaves open the question whether 
ecocentric war crimes would be actionable under the ATCA, but the cases do not provide much in 
the way of dicta to support such a claim. 
 
Another line of ATCA cases involves alleged environmental violations of the law of nations outside of 
the context of armed conflict. Few penal provisions exist in this area.60 Consequently, this line of 
ATCA cases covers ground that exceeds the scope of international criminal law and the collateral 
civil liability for environmental war crimes as argued in Agent Orange. However, several courts called 
upon to adjudge whether violation of environmental rights can amount to an actionable violation of 
the laws of nations have been very reticent. Two cases are illustrative: Beanal and Flores.61 
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In Beanal v. Freeport McMoran, Inc., plaintiffs sued an international mining company for human 
rights violations, environmental abuses, and cultural genocide allegedly occurring at its Indonesian 
mine.62 The Fifth Circuit upheld Freeport McMoran’s successful motion to dismiss on the basis that 
the alleged violations failed to state claims upon which relief could be granted. While plaintiffs’ 
human rights allegations lacked the requisite specificity to put the defendant on notice,63 the alleged 
environmental torts lacked cognizance under the law of nations because plaintiffs failed to 
demonstrate that the alleged activities violated internationally accepted norms or standards.64 
Beanal’s reliance on the Rio Declaration and other alleged sources of international environmental 
law65 did not meet the necessary standards of showing that the “treaties and agreements enjoy 
universal acceptance in the international community.”66 The court stated that the proffered sources 
“merely refer to a general sense of environmental responsibility and state abstract rights and liberties 
devoid of articulable or discernable standards and regulations to identify practices that constitute 
international environmental abuses or torts.”67 Assuredly, the Rio Declaration is a soft law document 
and, consequently, not an official source of international environmental law; however, some of its 
principles do reflect what has been elsewhere described as customary international environmental law 
or general principles of law.68 In any event, the court also underscored the argument against 
interfering with a nation’s alleged environmental torts and abuses when such actions exist within the 
nation without affecting neighboring states.69  
 
The plaintiffs in Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corporation were Peruvian residents and agents of 
deceased residents who brought suit against a U.S. copper mining corporation, claiming that sulfur 
dioxide pollution from defendant’s operations in Ilo, Peru, resulted in fatal respiratory illnesses such 
as lung disease. The plaintiffs claimed that this intra-national pollution violated customary 
international law obligations such as “right to life,” “right to health,” and “right to sustainable 
development.”70 The district court dismissed the claims for failure to plead any violations of 
customary international law.71 The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment, holding that plaintiffs 
failed to allege violations of customary international law. The ruling assessed the rights to life and 
health claims as well as the intra-national pollution claims, finding that none of the allegations 
implicated principles of customary international law.72 While the ATCA requires that plaintiffs 
allege violations of “clear and unambiguous” prohibitions, the Second Circuit Court characterized 
the evidence on which plaintiffs relied to define rights to life and health as “vague and amorphous.”73 
The Circuit Court described the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and the Rio 
Declaration principles as “boundless and indeterminate.”74 “They express virtuous goals 
understandably expressed at a level of abstraction needed to secure the adherence of States that 
disagree on many of the particulars regarding how actually to achieve them.”75 In one instance, the 
Second Circuit described the ICESCR language as “nebulous notions that are infinitely malleable.”76 
 
With respect to the intra-national pollution claims, the plaintiffs’ reliance on various treaties, 
conventions, and covenants failed to demonstrate that any of the specified instruments actually 
established a prohibitive legal principle. Examples of General Assembly documents, multinational 
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declarations of principle, and multinational tribunal decisions did not support the existence of 
customary international law. At one point, the ICESCR was referred to as “vague and 
aspirational . . . [with] no evidence that the States parties have taken significant uniform steps to put 
it into practice.”77 The Circuit Court held that there was no customary international rule against 
intra-national pollution. In the end, the Circuit Court affirmed the motion to dismiss. It did not 
consider transnational pollution since no allegations were made of harmful activity outside of Peru. 
 
These ATCA cases are instructive because they demonstrate that civil remedies for infringement of 
environmental rights, or cognate rights to health (for example, in Flores), are poorly articulated and 
thinly justiciable. Underpinning many of these judgments is a concern that robust interpretation of 
the ATCA in the context of environmental harms allegedly committed by corporate actors would 
lead to an interference in the foreign relations of the United States and produce a possible chilling 
effect on foreign investment that would be injurious to host developing countries. An alternate 
narrative, however, suggests that a robust interpretation of the ATCA might improve regulatory 
supervision and ensure that these foreign investments do more to benefit people who actually live in 
the host country. 
 
Property Crimes and Expropriation 
 
Property crimes such as destruction of homes, possessions, and farms are commonplace in armed 
conflict and atrocity. For many survivors, recovery is difficult when everything they owned has been 
destroyed. Restoration and restitution of real and personal property is, therefore, central to any 
process of reconciliation and justice. Whether criminal prosecutions are successful in this regard 
remains contested. Restitutionary claims have not been brought before the ad hoc international 
tribunals, and it is unclear what direction the ICC’s more purposive incorporation of restitutionary 
remedies shall lead. Lawsuits and declaratory requests in non-criminal law courts may also play a 
role. This is especially true for unlawful economic activities that may fall short of explicitly incurring 
penal responsibility, such as expropriation,78 discriminatory denial of state benefits, or takings.   
 
Criminal Prosecution  
 
Discussion regarding the kinds of conduct that the crime of persecution might encompass has 
included property crimes such as destruction of homes. However, unless such property destruction 
was part of a broader series or pattern of rights violations, which include violent denial of core civil 
and political rights, prosecution before an international tribunal appears doubtful. 
 
The breadth of the crime against humanity of persecution was carefully considered by the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. 
Kupreskić et al.79 All six accused were charged with the crime against humanity of persecution, 
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specifically on the grounds that from October 1993 to April 1993 they persecuted Bosnian Muslims 
by “planning, organizing and implementing an attack which was designed to remove all Bosnian 
Muslims from the village and surrounding areas.”80 “As part of this persecution the accused 
participated in or aided and abetted the deliberate and systematic killing of Bosnian Muslim 
civilians, the comprehensive destruction of their homes and property, and their organized detention 
and expulsion.”81 The ICTY Trial Chamber engaged in a lengthy discussion of the scope of the 
crime of persecution. It engaged with a number of sources, including refugee law82 and human rights 
law,83 but ultimately concluded that “[i]t would be contrary to the principle of legality to convict 
someone of persecution based on a definition found in international refugee law or human rights 
law.”84 
 
Turning to international criminal law as a source for the content of the crime of persecution, the 
Trial Chamber noted that the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg “described the 
progression of infringement of rights, which started with the deprivation of rights and citizenship; 
rights to work and education; economic and property rights; and then led to arrest and confinement 
in concentration camps; beatings, mutilation and torture; deportations; slave labor and ‘finally over 
six million were murdered.’”85 In this regard, the Trial Chamber underscored that massive violations 
of civil and political rights often begin with violations of socioeconomic rights. However, referring to 
the IMT judgment, the Trial Chamber went on to note: 
 
The Judgement of the IMT included in the notion of persecution a variety of acts 
which, at present, may not fall under the Statute of the [ICTY], such as the passing 
of discriminatory laws, the exclusion of members of an ethnic or religious group from 
aspects of social, political, and economic life, the imposition of a collective fine on 
them, the restriction of their movement and their seclusion in ghettos, and the 
requirement that they mark themselves out by wearing a yellow star. Moreover . . . 
several individual defendants were convicted of persecution in the form of 
discriminatory economic acts.86 
 
After reviewing the IMT judgment, the judgments of the Nuremberg subsequent proceedings, and 
the judgments of national courts regarding Nazi atrocity, the ICTY Trial Chamber concluded that 
“persecution can consist of the deprivation of a wide variety of rights”87 and that “[a] narrow 
definition of persecution is not supported in customary international law.”88 The Trial Chamber 
additionally held that, in addition to “acts such as murder, extermination, torture, and other serious 
acts on the person . . . [p]ersecution can also involve a variety of other discriminatory acts, involving 
attacks on political, social, and economic rights.”89 The Trial Chamber attached importance to 
whether the acts occur in a series or pattern or, on the other hand, are comprised of a single act. 
Accordingly, “[a]cts of persecution will usually form part of a policy or at least of a patterned 
practice.”90  
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The Trial Chamber defined persecution as “the gross or blatant denial, on discriminatory grounds, 
of a fundamental right, laid down in international customary or treaty law, reaching the same level of 
gravity as the other acts prohibited in Article 5 [of the ICTY Statute].”91 Applying this definition to 
the case before it, the Trial Chamber found that “deliberate and systematic killing of Bosnian 
Muslim civilians” and their “organized detention and expulsion from Ahmici” could constitute 
persecution.92 As to the question whether comprehensive destruction of Bosnian Muslim homes and 
property can constitute persecution, the Trial Chamber’s analysis is as follows: 
 
The question here is whether certain property or economic rights can be considered 
so fundamental that their denial is capable of constituting persecution. The Trial 
Chamber notes that in the Judgement of the IMT, several defendants were convicted 
of economic discrimination.93  
 
. . . . 
 
The Trial Chamber finds that attacks on property can constitute persecution. To 
some extent this may depend on the type of property involved . . . . There may be 
certain types of property whose destruction may not have a severe enough impact on 
the victim as to constitute a crime against humanity, even if such a destruction is 
perpetrated on discriminatory grounds: an example is the burning of someone’s car 
(unless the car constitutes an indispensable and vital asset to the owner). However, 
the case at hand concerns the comprehensive destruction of homes and property. 
Such an attack on property in fact constitutes a destruction of the livelihood of a 
certain population. This may have the same inhumane consequence as a forced 
transfer or deportation. Moreover, the burning of a residential property may often be 
committed with recklessness towards the lives of its inhabitants. The Trial Chamber 
therefore concludes that this act may constitute a gross or blatant denial of 
fundamental human rights, and, if committed on discriminatory grounds, it may 
constitute persecution.94 
 
Ultimately, for five of the six defendants, the Trial Chamber entered convictions for persecution 
based on the totality of the conduct against Bosnian Muslims. Some of these convictions were 
quashed on appeal,95 but not on the basis of revisiting the definition of persecution adopted by the 
Trial Chamber. The Appeals Chamber found that the factual proof of three defendants’ involvement 
fell short of that required for conviction and, thereby, reversed the persecution convictions. In two 
other cases, the Appeals Chamber accepted certain of the defendants’ appeals and reduced the 
sentence without reversing all of the convictions. Again, this appellate review did not touch upon the 
substantive scope of the crime of persecution as defined by the Trial Chamber. Consequently, 
former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour is correct to state that in the 
Kupreskić case the ICTY Trial Chamber recognized the comprehensive destruction of homes and 
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property as potentially constitutive of the crime against humanity of persecution when committed 




On the topic of expropriation, confiscation, and takings, the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECHR) regarding claims for the restitution of property unlawfully taken during a 
period of conflict or under authoritarian rule is instructive. The ECHR has issued judgments in 
many cases involving restitution and expropriation. Many expropriation cases involve post-
communist transition.97 Others involve expropriation as a matter of course of governmental 
regulation. Most germane to this discussion, other applications brought to the ECHR involve the 
relationship between expropriation and postconflict transition.  
 
Although the jurisprudence is not robust in the substantive discussion it offers, it is sufficiently 
developed to be distilled into two different schools—one that favors the present owner over the 
former owner, the other that favors the former owner over the present owner.98 Tom Allen finds that 
cases that favor the present owner tend to rely on principles of rule of law and the value of stability 
of expectations; in other words, “restitution threatens to undermine the foundations of the new 
market economies.”99 In contrast, judges who support restitutionary claims believe that the 
destabilizing threat thereof is overstated and, more proactively, “that the rule of law is strengthened 
by using past abuses of power as examples for future standards.”100 Allen notes that “it is argued that 
restitution is needed to restore dignity and to reinstate victims as full participants in the social, 
political and economic life of the community.”101 In this regard, restitution can ease victim and 
survivor reinsertion into society.  
 
In practice, restitution for an historical wrong may require the displacement of the current occupant. 
Although a state decision to pass a law to this effect receives deference, in the absence of such a law 
the ECHR is diffident regarding whether human rights law requires such an outcome. 
Consequently, in terms of an overall pattern of jurisprudence, the ECHR “seems to take little 
interest in these [restitution for historical takings] matters, apparently in the name of the rule of law 
and the all-important value of maintaining the stability of property relations.”102 The one major 
exception is the Loizidou case, decided by the Grand Chamber in 1996, which involved a claim 
against Turkey brought by Greek Cypriots for access to property where they had been living prior to 
the Turkish occupation in 1974 (the property had, following the occupation, been used to provide 
housing to Turkish Cypriot refugees).103 
 
Litigation involving restitution for unlawful takings generally touches upon Article 1 of Protocol No. 
1 to the European Convention on Human Rights. The Convention came into force in 1953 and 
Protocol No. 1 in 1954. Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 states that: “No one shall be deprived of his 
possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the 
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general principles of international law.” The right of a state to enforce law in the general interest, 
however, is not impaired. 
 
International law regarding expropriation is complex, but there is a general norm of compensation 
for the expropriation. In this vein, the ECHR has held as a general matter that “the taking of 
property without payment of an amount reasonably related to its value will normally constitute a 
disproportionate interference that cannot be considered justifiable under Article 1 of Protocol No. 
1.”104 In some cases, the ECHR has ruled that even when compensation has been offered by the 
state, this compensation was not adequate to satisfy this requirement.105 That said, the ECHR has 
generally taken a cautious approach to restitutionary claims in the context of postconflict situations. 
Two cases from Croatia are instructive. 
 
Blečić v. Croatia106 involves Croatian laws that permit courts to terminate specially protected 
tenancies when the tenant has been absent for over six months without justified reason. In the early 
1990s, many tenants fled due to armed conflict in Croatia (in Blečić’s case, in the town of Zadar). 
Blečić had challenged the termination of her tenancy within the Croatian court system. Her 
challenge ultimately was unsuccessful. She then alleged infringement of her right to respect for her 
home (a socioeconomic right found in Article 8 of the Convention) and also an expropriation claim 
under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. 
 
Evidence brought by a third-party intervener, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE), suggested that Croatian authorities tended to terminate, on the basis of absence for 
six months, the tenancies of a disproportionately larger number of ethnic Serbs than Croats: 
 
The OSCE argued that the applicant’s specially protected tenancy could be 
appropriately viewed only in the overall context of actions by the judiciary and 
legislature that had resulted in the mass termination of such tenancies during and 
after the homeland war in Croatia. It submitted that, from 1991 onwards, 23,700 
proceedings for the termination of specially protected tenancies had been initiated. 
 
Most of these proceedings had been instituted against persons of Serbian origin, 
which had resulted in a significant decline in the minority population in Croatia. In 
the OSCE’s view, the termination of specially protected tenancies had had a strong 
negative effect on minority return.107 
 
The OSCE also noted that individuals of minority ethnicity faced “harassment, threats, and in many 
cases, forcible eviction from their homes and property.”108 The OSCE “found it difficult to view 
absence from flats owing to war activities as voluntary in nature.”109  
 
The Chamber rejected the claim that Article 8 was violated, finding that the Croatian courts acted 
reasonably.110 It also rejected the claim that Croatia violated Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, finding that 
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“the interference in question was neither an expropriation nor a measure to control the use of 
property.”111 This left only the claim that the measure interfered with a right of property. The 
Chamber held, for the same reasons as applicable to the Article 8 discussion, that the measure was 
justifiable as serving a legitimate public or general interest.112 Moreover, the Chamber found that the 
interference struck a “fair balance between the demands of the general interest of the community and 
the requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights.”113 The Chamber, 
therefore, took a fairly cautious approach to both the socioeconomic right to home and also to the 
scope of impermissible expropriations. The Chamber avoided the much broader discussion of the 
purported ethnically motivated nature of the evictions.  
 
The matter then was referred to the Grand Chamber. By a vote of 11:6, the Grand Chamber found 
a lack of jurisdiction based on temporal considerations (ratione temporis) and based its analysis on a 
number of factors, including the general rules of international law.114 The Grand Chamber ruled 
that the allegedly interfering deprivation occurred at the moment the Supreme Court adjudged the 
matter—February 15, 1996—which pre-dated the entry into force of the Convention.115 The 
Constitutional Court decision “only resulted in allowing the interference . . . to subsist.”116 The 
Grand Chamber also held that “the deprivation of an individual’s home or property is in principle 
an instantaneous act and does not produce a continuing situation of ‘deprivation’ of these rights.”117 
Dissenting opinions were issued.118 All in all, the Grand Chamber ducked the issue. As Allen 
observes:  
 
[t]he Grand Chamber of the Court of Human Rights did not suggest that the 
application of the termination law was open to reproach. It therefore declined to 
consider the broader context in which this dispute occurred, and its reasoning does 
not disclose the slightest hint that terminations of this type were often part of a larger 
campaign of ethnic cleansing.119  
 
Overall, as Allen remarks: “The general trend is against any re-opening of disputes arising from pre-
transitional conduct . . . . The stability of present entitlements is preferred over the reinstatement of 
former titles.”120 Doing justice for the past may involve violating the rights of present owners, which 




This part of the paper has surveyed the justiciability in both criminal and civil contexts of two sets of 
violations of socioeconomic and environmental rights: (1) widespread, long-term, and severe 
environmental harm during international armed conflict and environmental destruction 
independent of armed conflict, and (2) property crimes and expropriation. These case studies help 
illustrate that socioeconomic and environmental crimes are thinly articulated in extant international 
criminal law. Furthermore, the robustness with which socioeconomic and environmental rights are 
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articulated in civil courts (whether in suits for tort, restitution, or declaratory relief) is lower than 
that of core civil and political rights.  
 
In sum, the modest way in which socioeconomic and environmental rights are articulated in 
criminal and civil contexts is traceable to a number of reasons:  
 
• the aspirational, rather than mandatory, nature of the rights (for example, ATCA 
environmental litigation); 
 
• the vagueness of the actual proscriptions, the onerous actus reus and mens rea requirements, 
or readily available defenses (for example, article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute and post-
World War II environmental war crimes prosecutions);  
 
• political pressures and resource limitations that push toward sanctioning only individual 
responsibility for the most severe civil and political rights violations (for example, property 
damage prosecuted at the ICTY as part of a much broader persecutory set of violence to 
persons);  
 
• evidentiary difficulties in connecting individuals with systemic socioeconomic and 
environmental wrongdoing and concern that aggressive prosecutions might undermine 
defendants’ rights, due process guarantees, and serve ulterior state purposes;  
 
• lack of scientific and forensic expertise among international judges and investigators;  
 
• concern over political questions such as interfering with a government’s regulatory authority, 
comity among nations, and chilling effects on foreign investment (for example, ECHR 
cases); and  
 
• concern with remedies—justice for past socioeconomic violations may create new violations 
to third parties (for example, ECHR jurisprudence on expropriation and restitution) or may 
be ineffective to deal with the nature of the harm (for example, criminal sanction for article 
8(2)(b)(iv) and ecocentric war crimes).  
 
Although there has been some jurisprudential movement toward structural and corporate liability for 
massive human rights abuses, this movement has by and large been limited to conspiracy and aiding 
and abetting core civil and political rights violations. The goals of fleshing out socioeconomic and 
environmental aspects of conflict, or the role that socioeconomic and environmental rights violations 
play in the subtext of mass atrocity, have not animated the limited progress made in extending 
accountability to organizations, corporations, or systemic elements. This is a shortfall, insofar as tools 
of socioeconomic and environmental rights violations often are central to the enterprise of atrocity. 




www.ictj.org       21 
Along with overt acts of personal violence, murder, and sexual torture, the narrative of atrocity—for 
example in Darfur—is underpinned by systemic destruction of food crops, starvation, burning of 
homes and villages, interference with humanitarian missions, endemic discrimination, and forced 
displacement. All these methods of oppression are used alongside murder and rape to achieve 
nefarious ends. When this conduct is not addressed, accountability remains underachieved. 
 
That said, as I have argued elsewhere, accountability is not limited to criminal prosecutions and civil 
lawsuits.121 Judicialization is only part of the picture. Consequently, the question remains whether 
augmenting individualized criminal prosecutions and civil lawsuits for socioeconomic and 
environmental rights violations will promote justice and accountability and, if so, whether it will do 
so in a manner more effective than investing time, resources, and energy in alternate forms of 
accountability, such as truth commissions, reparations, constitutional reform, memorialization, 
public inquiries, affirmative action, and instantiating pedagogy.   
 
Should Those Committed to Justice and Development Promote 
the Enforcement of Socioeconomic and Environmental Rights 
through Prosecutions and Litigation? 
 
Arbour would say yes. She posits: “The use of statutes of existing international and national courts to 
adjudicate economic, social, and cultural violations as international crimes should thus be further 
explored. We should also consider . . . expanding the current scope of international criminal law to 
encompass other gross violations of economic, social and cultural rights.”122 In this final part of the 
paper, I hope to examine this contention more closely. Is it worthwhile to extend resources in the 
direction of judicializing socioeconomic and environmental crimes through criminal responsibility? I 
would extend the debate beyond Arbour’s contention and inquire the same of civil liability. 
Assuredly, there are no clean or simple answers. To this end, I consider the potential benefits and 
limits to judicializing socioeconomic violations. The purpose of this discussion is to foster dialogue 
and further research, in particular on the linkages between expanded judicialization and 
development. How might expanded judicialization promote development? How might it inhibit it?  
 
Many of the benefits and limits of criminal prosecutions for property and environmental rights 
violations parallel those of criminal prosecutions for core civil and political rights violations. I have 
written elsewhere that the most plausible goal for criminal prosecutions for core international crimes 
is expressivism: 
 
Expressivists contend that trial, conviction, and punishment appreciate public respect 
for law. The expressivist punishes to strengthen faith in rule of law among the general 
public, as opposed to punishing simply because the perpetrator deserves it or because 
potential perpetrators will be deterred by it. Expressivism [also] claim[s] as a central 
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goal the crafting of historical narratives, their authentication as truths, and their 
pedagogical dissemination to the public.123 
 
Criminal prosecutions for socioeconomic and environmental crimes can serve expressive goals. Such 
prosecutions can expose wrongdoing and stigmatize it as criminal. They can help bridge 
international human rights law and international criminal law, thereby girding connections between 
related yet disparate areas of law. Prosecutions can also help prospectively build a culture supportive 
of socioeconomic and environmental rights. Prosecuting socioeconomic and environmental 
wrongdoing that has facilitated mass atrocity can offer a more fulsome picture of justice for victim 
communities and narrate a story that is much more representative of the multi-causal origins of mass 
atrocity and its gradual, and often incremental, implementation. To the extent that prosecutions 
flesh out educational and economic inequities, and address matters of gender discrimination, they 
may well contribute to a more salutary postconflict socio-legal environment. 
 
Prosecutions, whether for civil and political or socioeconomic crimes, can play a valuable role in 
normalizing rule of law values, building a new sense of community, and authenticating an 
authoritative historical record. Purposively injecting anti-discrimination norms into a society can 
mitigate the threat that renewed discrimination-based violence metastasizes into wide-scale atrocity. 
In addition to meting out justice, prosecutions can train personnel and help build civil society.124 In 
each of these regards, effective and genuine outreach to local communities is key. International or 
internationalized prosecutions will be more effective in attaining these capacity-building goals if they 
are more deeply anchored within the postconflict society. International involvement without 
corresponding expansion of domestic capacity may continue to feed the need for more international 
involvement and eventually “undermin[e] long-term local confidence in the domestic legal 
system.”125 When rooted within the postconflict society, internationalized prosecutions may help 
build local capacity for rights enforcement (for example, in Croatia and Bosnia); however, experience 
instructs that internationalized proceedings are not always so anchored (for example, in Iraq, 
Kosovo, and Sierra Leone). When international interventions operate parallel to, or extraneous from, 
the postconflict society, they become subject to what has been aptly called the “spaceship 
phenomenon.”126 Similarly, extraterritorial litigation, whether criminal proceedings under universal 
jurisdiction or ATCA cases under specific statutory grants of power, may be located so far from the 
afflicted society that justice simply becomes externalized from that society. 
 
Shortfalls to criminal prosecutions, again whether for civil and political or socioeconomic crimes, 
include: unrealistic expectations about the transformative potential of trials and sanctions; an 
inability to actualize retributive and deterrent aspirations; frustration among victim communities 
with the pace of trials; defendants’ ability to grandstand; the dehumanization of victims that can 
result from the defendants’ deployment of due process entitlements; transplants of Western 
adversarial legalism into socio-legal contexts where such adversarial legalism is alien; the historical 
narrative being more scripted by the laws of evidence than what actually happened; and competition 
instead of synergy with other justice initiatives. Criminal trials of a handful of invidious offenders 
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may obfuscate the reality that massive levels of atrocity result from the involvement of large numbers 
of perpetrators and the acquiescence and support of broad swaths of the community. Consequently, 
international criminal trials may collectivize innocence on social groups that really are not so 
innocent. Socioeconomic and environmental crimes may fit even more brusquely with the paradigm 
of individual penal responsibility that is the cornerstone of criminal prosecutions. Proceeding 
through adversarial litigation requires clear satisfaction of what Albie Sachs terms “microscopic” 
truths which, in turn, may become problematic for claims involving diffuse and multi-causal sources. 
Prosecutions may become frustrated and, in response to those frustrations, may be tempted to 
trample on due process protections. 
 
Cost is also a relevant factor. Criminal prosecutions for environmental and socioeconomic crimes are 
expensive, especially when conducted at the international level. Although—in a purist sense—there 
cannot be a cost affixed to justice, in a context of limited resources it would be impractical not to 
make assessments regarding the cost of criminal prosecutions and compare those to the costs of other 
justice modalities or, even, other infrastructure projects.127 Moreover, it is also fair to inquire whether 
the limited pot going to prosecutions will be divvied up to cover environmental and socioeconomic 
crimes, or whether it will be directed at what the public perceives as the more serious crimes of 
concern to humanity as a whole, which will traditionally gravitate to massive and brutal violations of 
civil and political rights. Too broad a swath of prosecutions for a variety of crimes may conflict with 
the ICC’s focus on a small number of perpetrators of the most notorious offenses. Carrying the 
weight of such prosecutions may, in turn, require the involvement of local actors with its attendant 
benefits and, assuredly, risks. If local communities are pressured into criminal prosecutions by the 
transplant effects of internationalized justice paradigms, then democratic deficits may arise insofar as 
local communities may prefer alternate non-adversarial modalities of justice.128 
 
I have elsewhere underscored the importance of civil remedies and of horizontally expanding the 
sites where justice actors operate. I would apply this to the context of socioeconomic crimes as well. 
When a violation of international criminal law attracts civil liability, wrongdoing becomes addressed 
by diffuse layers of law. Accountability becomes available in multiple fora. Plaintiffs in ATCA 
litigation have expressed comfort with the lower thresholds of liability that are required for civil tort 
claims. While civil judgments are often uncollectible because the defendant is destitute or beyond 
the enforcement jurisdiction of the court, these judgments often serve important declaratory and 
pedagogical roles (for example, the Kadić judgment on sexual violence in Bosnia).  
 
Paradoxically, however, too much judicialization—particularly in the context of corporate actors—
might chill foreign investment and, thereby, inhibit economic development in certain developing 
states. Too much legalization might threaten a postconflict government and its policy choices (for 
example, South Africa, in its response to challenges to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
brought in ATCA litigation).129 State responsibility (and other forms of collective responsibility) may 
bankrupt a postconflict state through damage awards of billions of dollars (for example, what could 
have been awarded against Serbia, were the International Court of Justice to have actually issued a 
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damages award).130 State responsibility may make it impossible for a government seeking to 
transition a state past genocide to escape the shadow of its genocidal predecessor (for example, claims 
that the Rwandan state, which had been run by a genocidal government, committed genocide when 
such state liability would be passed onto a successor government). State responsibility might 
dehumanize an entire collectivity and thereby make transitional efforts all the more difficult. In a 
situation where a postconflict government is genuinely trying to move toward protection of human 
rights, democratization, and economic opportunity, such damage awards could be particularly 
deleterious to developmental and transitional goals.131  
 
Alternatively, the prospect of collective responsibility might serve a gate-keeping function in that the 
public is incentivized to stamp out discriminatory conflict entrepreneurs early on, serve defendants 
up for prosecution (for example, Indonesia regarding Timor-Leste), or push postconflict 
governments toward greater respect for human rights in hopes that such good faith might augment 
political pressure in the international community (or within international courts) not to impose a 
damage award.  
 
Lawsuits that pursue restitutionary ends can avoid some of the debates over collective responsibility 
and circumvent the chilling effects of civil tort liability and the possibility for punitive damages. 
Such lawsuits are often focused on specific property that has passed hands in times of conflict or in a 
postconflict period. The claims, therefore, are based on notions of corrective justice and 
compensation. Restitutionary claims may arise in situations where there are refugees. Individuals 
fleeing a conflict area because they are potential victims or individuals fleeing postconflict zones 
because they fear reprisals or denunciations may find that their property is occupied by others upon 
their return. Unless there is access to some sort of judicialized process to hear their grievances, 
reconciliation will be impeded. On the other hand, the following finding by Tom Allen is germane 
to any discussion of the normative value of judicialized restitutionary claims for expropriations:  
 
[T]here is no general consensus on the desirability of restitution. For example, it is 
not clear that restitution either advances or retards economic growth. The effect of 
restitution on the rule of law is also disputed. It has been argued that restitution 
demonstrates a commitment to the rule of law, by distinguishing the present regime 
from its predecessor and by providing a positive signal that property rights will be 
respected in future, but this is countered by concerns that the rule of law would be 
undermined by restitution programs that upset titles that were acquired in good faith 
during the pre-transitional era.132 
 
Retrospective application of the law, whether criminal or civil, after harms have occurred can only 
do so much, especially in the case of environmental damage. It is important to think preventatively 
as well, in a manner that goes well beyond what I believe to be the thin deterrent value of 
prosecutions and extant correctional preferences (that is, imprisonment). If a handful of retrospective 
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criminal prosecutions or civil lawsuits lull us into believing that we have effected justice, this is cause 
for concern. In the context of environmental war crimes, as I have argued elsewhere:  
 
What is more important is to provide incentives not to act in environmentally 
threatening ways in the first place. Examples include the creation of economic 
disincentives to producing environmentally destructive weaponry, technology 
transfers to assist developing countries to pursue national security interests in a more 
environmentally friendly manner, and financial assistance mechanisms.133 
 
Aggressive, preventative peacekeeping also may be effective in mitigating environmental damage and 
many socioeconomic rights violations.134 
 
Any advantages that criminal prosecutions and civil lawsuits bring to the table in promoting justice, 
reconciliation, and development may be lost if these judicialized interventions squeeze out alternate 
forms of accountability. Justice modalities outside the strictures of adversarial tribunals hold 
considerable promise in promoting developmental aims. International insurance schemes may well 
be the only way to provide remediation funds for massive environmental harms. Their existence, 
however, may create the kind of moral hazard that criminal prosecutions seek to dispel. Reparations 
also are seen by many victims as a central element of the justice matrix. However, “development 
programs have a very low reparative capacity, for they do not target victims specifically, and what 
they normally try to achieve is to satisfy basic and urgent needs, which makes their beneficiaries 
perceive such programs, correctly, as ones that distribute goods to which they have rights as citizens, 
and not necessarily as victims.”135 Moreover, if implemented in a country where both oppressor and 
victim groups share the same public citizenship space—for example, Rwanda—reparations schemes 
may help both “sides” equally, despite the moral imbalance among “sides.” 
 
Other mechanisms of transitional justice,136 such as truth commissions, may be better suited than 
adversarial prosecution and litigation to address socioeconomic and environmental wrongs. There is 
cause, however, to question extant methods of measuring the effectiveness of truth commissions.137 
Lustration and vetting also are valuable tools in the postconflict tool-kit. Here, too, there is cause for 
concern with regard to establishing the appropriate level of administrative justice: for example, there 
was too much in Iraq, but too little in Afghanistan.138 Embedding economic, social, and cultural 
rights in new national constitutional structures that arise from transitional political settlements may 
be easier to attain and more successful than retrospectively imposing punishment or liability for 
breach of such rights.139 Declaratory and injunctive relief can promote enforcement of rights instead 
of punishing their historical violation. Peace agreements and international administration, such as 
the UN Mission in Kosovo, also may be effective locations in which to anchor discussion of 
socioeconomic and environmental rights.140 Finally, any judicialization effort should not ride 
roughshod over local, and often restorative, forms of justice, such as mato oput in Uganda, biti bot in 
Timor-Leste, jirga (enforcing Pashtunwali) in Afghanistan,141 or neo-traditional gacaca in Rwanda. 
Assuredly, though, each of these, in particular the Pashtunwali, triggers deep concerns.142 
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In conclusion, should those committed to promoting justice and development consider the 
enforcement of socioeconomic and environmental rights through prosecutions and litigation? Yes, 
but they should do so with considerable caution, modesty, and care—realizing all the while that 
judicializaton is not synonymous with accountability. International criminal and human rights law, 
whether enforced through prosecutions or civil lawsuits, is only part of a more textured and 
composite picture of international justice. 
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